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We have used deterministic single-photon two qubit (SPTQ) quantum logic to implement the
most powerful individual-photon attack against the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key
distribution protocol. Our measurement results, including physical source and gate errors, are
in good agreement with theoretical predictions for the Re´nyi information obtained by Eve as a
function of the errors she imparts to Alice and Bob’s sifted key bits. The current experiment is a
physical simulation of a true attack, because Eve has access to Bob’s physical receiver module. This
experiment illustrates the utility of an efficient deterministic quantum logic for performing realistic
physical simulations of quantum information processing functions.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a, 42.65.Lm
In 1984 Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed a protocol
(BB84) for quantum key distribution (QKD) in which
the sender (Alice) transmits single-photon pulses to the
receiver (Bob) in such a way that security is vouchsafed
by physical laws. Since then, BB84 has been the subject
of many security analyses [2], particularly for configu-
rations that involve nonideal operating conditions, such
as the use of weak laser pulses in lieu of single photons.
A more fundamental question is how much information
the eavesdropper (Eve) can gain under ideal BB84 oper-
ating conditions. Papers by Fuchs and Peres [3], Slut-
sky et al. [4], and Brandt [5] show that the most pow-
erful individual-photon attack can be accomplished with
a controlled-not (cnot) gate. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
Eve supplies the target qubit to the cnot gate, which
entangles it with the BB84 qubit that Alice is sending
to Bob. Eve then makes her measurement of the target
qubit to obtain information on the shared key bit at the
expense of imposing detectable errors between Alice and
Bob [5, 6].
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Block diagram of the Fuchs-Peres-
Brandt probe for attacking BB84 QKD.
We have recently shown [6] that this Fuchs-Peres-
Brandt (FPB) entangling probe can be implemented us-
ing single-photon two-qubit (SPTQ) quantum logic in
a proof-of-principle experiment. In SPTQ logic a sin-
gle photon carries two independent qubits: the polariza-
tion and the momentum (or spatial orientation) states of
the photon. Compared to standard two-photon quantum
gates, SPTQ gates are deterministic and can be efficiently
implemented using only linear optical elements. We have
∗Electronic address: thkim@mit.edu
previously demonstrated cnot [7] and swap [8] gates in
this SPTQ quantum logic platform. SPTQ logic affords
a simple yet powerful way to investigate few-qubit quan-
tum information processing tasks.
In this work we use SPTQ logic to implement the FPB
probe as a complete physical simulation of the most pow-
erful attack on BB84, including physical errors. This is to
our knowledge the first experiment on attacking BB84,
and the results are in good agreement with theoretical
predictions. It is only a physical simulation because the
two qubits of a single photon carrier must be measured
jointly, so that Eve needs access to Bob’s receiver, but
not his measurement. The SPTQ probe could become
a true attack if quantum nondemolition measurements
were available to Eve [6]. Nevertheless, the physical sim-
ulation allows investigation of the fundamental security
limit of BB84 against eavesdropping in the presence of
realistic physical errors, and it affords the opportunity
to study the effectiveness of privacy amplification when
BB84 is attacked.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Relations between different bases. (a)
Control qubit basis for Eve’s cnot gate referenced to the
BB84 polarization states. (b) |T0〉 and |T1〉 relative to the
target qubit basis.
In BB84, Alice sends Bob a single photon randomly
chosen from the four polarization states of the horizontal-
vertical (H–V ) and ±45◦ (D–A) bases. In the FPB at-
tack, Eve sets up her cnot gate with its control-qubit
computational basis, {|0〉C, |1〉C}, given by pi/8 rotation
from the BB84 H-V basis, as shown in Fig. 2(a),
|0〉C = cos(pi/8)|H〉+ sin(pi/8)|V 〉 ,
|1〉C = − sin(pi/8)|H〉+ cos(pi/8)|V 〉 . (1)
2Having selected the error probability, PE , that she is will-
ing to create, Eve prepares her probe qubit (cnot’s tar-
get) in the initial state
|Tin〉 = {(C + S)|0〉T + (C − S)|1〉T}/
√
2
≡ cos θin|0〉T + sin θin|1〉T (2)
where C =
√
1− 2PE , S =
√
2PE , and {|0〉T, |1〉T} is
the target qubit’s computational basis. After the cnot
operation—with inputs from Alice’s photon and Eve’s
probe—the two qubits become entangled. For each of
Alice’s four possible inputs, |H〉, |V 〉, |D〉, and |A〉, the
output of the cnot gate is
|H〉|Tin〉 → |Hout〉 ≡ |H〉|T0〉+ |V 〉|TE〉 , (3)
|V 〉|Tin〉 → |Vout〉 ≡ |V 〉|T1〉+ |H〉|TE〉 , (4)
|D〉|Tin〉 → |Dout〉 ≡ |D〉|T0〉 − |A〉|TE〉 , (5)
|A〉|Tin〉 → |Aout〉 ≡ |A〉|T1〉 − |D〉|TE〉 , (6)
where |T0〉, T1〉, and |TE〉 are defined in the target qubit’s
computational basis (see Fig. 2(b)) as:
|T0〉 ≡
(
C√
2
+
S
2
)
|0〉T +
(
C√
2
− S
2
)
|1〉T , (7)
|T1〉 ≡
(
C√
2
− S
2
)
|0〉T +
(
C√
2
+
S
2
)
|1〉T , (8)
|TE〉 ≡ S
2
(|0〉T − |1〉T) . (9)
Consider the case in which Bob measures in the same
basis that Alice employed and his outcome matches what
Alice sent. Then, according to Eqs. (3)–(6), the target
qubit is projected into either |T0〉 or |T1〉. After Alice
and Bob compare their basis selections over the classical
channel, Eve can learn about their shared bit value by
distinguishing between the |T0〉 and |T1〉 output states of
her target qubit. To do so, she employs the minimum
error probability receiver for distinguishing between |T0〉
and |T1〉 by performing a projective measurement along
|0〉T and |1〉T. Eve can then correlate the measurement
of |0〉T (|1〉T) with |T0〉 (|T1〉). Note that this projec-
tive measurement is not perfect unless |T0〉 and |T1〉 are
orthogonal and hence coincide with the target’s compu-
tational basis, |0〉T and |1〉T.
Of course, Eve’s information gain comes at a cost: Eve
has caused an error event whenever Alice and Bob choose
a common basis and Eve’s probe output state is |TE〉.
When Alice sent |H〉 and Bob measured in the H–V ba-
sis, Eq. (3) then shows that Alice and Bob will have an
error event if the measured output state is |V 〉|TE〉. The
probability that this will occur is 〈TE |TE〉 = S2/2 = PE .
For the other three cases in Eqs. (4)–(6), the error event
corresponds to the last term in each expression. There-
fore the conditional error probabilities are identical, and
hence PE is the unconditional error probability.
To quantify Eve’s information gain, we use the Re´nyi
information that she derives about the sift events in
which Bob correctly measures Alice’s qubit. Let B =
RE
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FIG. 3: Quantum circuit diagram for the FPB-probe attack.
Photon 1 of a polarization-entangled singlet photon pair her-
alds photon 2 and sets Eve’s probe qubit to its initial state.
The swap gate allows Alice’s qubit to be set in the polar-
ization mode of photon 2, whose momentum mode is Eve’s
probe qubit. The cnot gate entangles Alice’s qubit with
Eve’s qubit. RE, rotation by Eve; RA, rotation by Alice;
RB, rotation by Bob; R±pi/8, rotation by angle ±pi/8.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Experimental configuration for a com-
plete physical simulation of the FPB attack on BB84. SPDC,
spontaneous parametric down-conversion source; H, half-wave
plate; Q, quarter-wave plate; P, polarizing beam splitter; D,
single-photon detector.
{0, 1} and E = {0, 1} denote the ensembles of possible
bit values that Bob and Eve receive on an error-free sift
event. The Re´nyi information (in bits) that Eve learns
about each error-free sift event is
IR ≡ − log2
(
1∑
b=0
P 2(b)
)
+
1∑
e=0
P (e) log2
(
1∑
b=0
P 2(b|e)
)
,
(10)
where {P (b), P (e)} are the a priori probabilities for Bob’s
and Eve’s bit values, and P (b|e) is the conditional prob-
ability for Bob’s bit value to be b given that Eve’s is
e. According to Bayes’ rule, P (b|e) can be calculated in
terms of P (b, e) which is the probability of both Bob’s
bit to be b and Eve’s bit to be e:
P (b|e) = P (b, e)/
1∑
b=0
P (b, e), (11)
where P (b = 0, e) = |(〈H | ⊗ T〈e|)|Hout〉|2 and P (b =
1, e) = |(〈V | ⊗ T〈e|)|Vout〉|2 in the case of H–V basis
(|H〉 corresponds to b = 0). A similar calculation for the
D–A basis, with |D〉 corresponding to b = 0 then leads
to the final result
IR = log2
(
1 +
4PE(1− 2PE)
(1− PE)2
)
. (12)
Ideally, Eve’s Re´nyi information is the same for both the
H–V and D–A bases, but in actual experiments it may
differ, owing to differing equipment errors in each basis.
3Coincidence Estimated Expected
Alice PE |1〉|0〉 |1〉|1〉 |0〉|1〉 |0〉|0〉 |1〉|0〉 |1〉|1〉 |0〉|1〉 |0〉|0〉 |1〉|0〉 |1〉|1〉 |0〉|1〉 |0〉|0〉
0 1356 1836 23408 23356 0.027 0.037 0.469 0.468 0 0 0.500 0.500
|D〉 0.1 2840 4220 9664 32592 0.058 0.086 0.196 0.661 0.050 0.050 0.167 0.733
0.33 7512 9496 1512 30916 0.152 0.192 0.031 0.625 0.167 0.167 0 0.667
0 22664 23388 1140 1112 0.469 0.484 0.024 0.023 0.500 0.500 0 0
|A〉 0.1 8480 34492 4088 2052 0.173 0.702 0.083 0.042 0.167 0.733 0.050 0.050
0.33 1096 32360 9384 6564 0.022 0.655 0.19 0.133 0 0.667 0.167 0.167
TABLE I: Data samples, estimated probabilities, and theoretical values for D and A inputs with Bob using the same basis
as Alice, and for predicted error probabilities PE = 0, 0.1, and 0.33. |0〉|1〉 corresponds to Bob’s measuring |D〉 and Eve’s
measuring |1〉T. Column 1 shows the state Alice sent and column 2 shows the predicted error probability PE . “Coincidence”
columns show coincidence counts over a 40-s interval. “Estimated” columns show the measured coincidence counts normalized
by the total counts of all four detectors, and “Expected” shows the theoretical values under ideal operating conditions.
Figure 3 shows the quantum circuit diagram of our
SPTQ implementation of the FPB probe. We start with
a pair of polarization-entangled photons in the singlet
state. Photon 1 is used as a trigger to herald photon 2
as a single-photon pulse for the BB84 protocol. A swap
operation applied to photon 2 exchanges its polarization
and momentum qubits so that the polarization of photon
1 and the momentum of photon 2 are now entangled in
a singlet state. Eve encodes her probe qubit in the mo-
mentum state of photon 2 by projecting photon 1 along
an appropriate polarization state set by a polarization
rotation RE. The polarization state of photon 2 after the
swap gate is Alice’s qubit, which is set by rotation RA.
Similarly, Bob’s polarization analysis of Alice’s qubit is
set by RB. The cnot gate in Fig. 3 is preceded by a−pi/8
rotation and followed by a +pi/8 rotation because the ba-
sis for the cnot’s control qubit is rotated by pi/8 from the
BB84 bases, as noted in Fig. 2. The cnot gate that Eve
employs is a polarization-controlled not (p-cnot) gate
that uses the polarization qubit as the control and the
momentum qubit of the same photon as the target. We
have previously demonstrated such a gate in a polariza-
tion Sagnac interferometer with an embedded dove prism
[7]. We have also demonstrated the swap operation [8]
by cascading three cnot gates: a momentum-controlled
not (m-cnot), a p-cnot, and another m-cnot.
Figure 4 shows our experimental setup for implement-
ing the quantum circuit. We used a bidirectionally
pumped Sagnac interferometric down-conversion source
[11] with a periodically poled KTiOPO4 (PPKTP) crys-
tal to generate polarization-entangled photons at 810 nm
in the singlet state. The measured flux was ∼700 pairs/s
per mW of pump in a 1 nm bandwidth at ∼99.45% visi-
bility quantum interference. The collimated output beam
had a beam waist of w0 = 0.53 mm. In a collimated con-
figuration, the momentum state of a photon is the same
as the spatial orientation of the beam, which we use the
right–left (R–L) basis in this experiment. The L and R
beams were separated by ∼2 mm.
For each photon pair, photon 1 is used to herald the
arrival of photon 2 and also to remotely control the mo-
mentum qubit of photon 2 by postselection. RE polariza-
tion rotation by Eve was implemented using a quarter-
wave plate (QWP) Q1 and a half-wave plate (HWP) H1,
followed by single-photon detection (D1) through a po-
larizing beam splitter (PBS) P1 along H . Q1 was used
to compensate an intrinsic phase shift ξ imposed by the
swap gate on the target-qubit basis {|0〉T, |1〉T}. We
have independently measured ξ ≃ 88◦. Therefore, the RE
operation prepared the momentum qubit in |T ′
in
〉 with a
Q1-imposed phase shift ξ
|T ′in〉 ≡ cos θin|0〉T + eiξ sin θin|1〉T . (13)
The extra phase shift of the swap gate would bring Eve’s
probe qubit to be in |Tin〉 of Eq. 2.
After the swap gate, RA and R−pi/8 were combined in
a single operation. The p-cnot gate had the same phase
shift problem as the swap gate, so we used a HWP (H2)
and a QWP (Q2) to compensate for this phase shift and
to impose the required rotation. After H2 and Q2 Alice’s
qubit becomes
|ΨA〉 ≡ cos θA|0〉C + eiχ sin θA|1〉C, (14)
where χ (≃ 98◦) is the compensating phase shift and θA
is −22.5◦, 22.5◦, 67.5◦, or 112.5◦ for |H〉, |D〉, |V 〉 or |A〉,
respectively, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Similarly we com-
bined Rpi/8 and RB into a single HWP (H3) in Fig. 4 and
a PBS (P2) was used by Bob to analyze the polarization
of Alice’s qubit.
Eve measured her qubit by a projective measurement
along the |0〉T–|1〉T (spatially, R–L) basis. A HWP
(H4/H5) was placed in the R or L beam path, as in-
dicated in Fig. 4, so that the R and L beams would
be distinguished by their orthogonal polarizations. This
polarization tagging simplified their measurements by a
PBS (P3/P4) and single-photon detectors. The four de-
tectors uniquely identified the two qubits of photon 2.
For example, D2 (D3) indicates R (L) for Eve’s qubit,
and either D2 or D3 suggests H polarization after Bob’s
analyzer. Therefore, in our physical simulation, the joint
measurement by Bob and Eve yields Bob’s polarization
information and Eve’s momentum information.
In data collection, we measured coincidences between
D1 and one of the detectors for photon 2. Table I shows
two data sets for Alice’s input of D and A polarizations
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Eve’s Re´nyi information IR about
Bob’s error-free sifted bits as a function of error probability
PE that her eavesdropping creates. Solid squares, solid line:
theoretical curve from Eq. (12). Solid diamonds, solid line:
measured values for H–V basis. Solid triangles, solid line:
measured values for D–A basis. Open diamonds, dashed line:
fitted curve with error model for H–V basis. Open triangles,
dashed line: fitted curve with error model for D–A basis.
and compares with the expected values for the ideal case.
From the raw data, we calculate the Re´nyi information
IR based on Eq. (10), and Fig. 5 plots IR as a func-
tion of the error probability PE for the ideal case (solid
squares, solid line), for the measured values with inputs
in the H–V basis (solid diamonds, solid line), and for
the measured values with inputs in the D–A basis (solid
triangles, solid line). We note that no background counts
were subtracted and the coincidence window was ∼1 ns.
In the ideal case with PE = 0, Eve gets no information,
IR = 0, and Alice and Bob have no error bits. However,
due to experimental errors such as imperfect gate fideli-
ties, we measured ∼5% of the sifted bits had errors. For
PE = 1/3, Eve obtains perfect information, IR = 1, but
in our experiment, Eve gained a maximum IR = 0.9 or,
on average, Eve gained 95% of the correct information
about Bob’s error-free sifted bits.
To understand the errors involved in the experiment,
we model our experimental setup with some non-ideal
parameters. We assume that the phases ξ in Eq. (13)
and χ in Eq. (14) could be inaccurate, and similarly for
the setting of θA in Eq. (14) that might be caused by the
wave plates. We also model the unitary p-cnot gate as

cosα ie−iδ sinα 0 0
ieiδ sinα cosα 0 0
0 0 −ieiδ sinα cosα
0 0 cosα −ie−iδ sinα

 ,
(15)
where α = 0 and δ = 0 for an ideal p-cnot gate. Finally
we assume that Bob’s HWP (H3) setting of θB was not
perfect such that
|H〉 → cos θB|0〉C − sin θB|1〉C , (16)
|V 〉 → sin θB|0〉C + cos θB|1〉C , (17)
where θB should equal 22.5
◦ (−22.5◦) in the H–V (D–A)
basis.
We fit the data by minimizing the differences be-
tween 96 measurements and the calculated numbers
based on this error model. The fitting results show
that ∆ξ ≃ 3◦, ∆χ ≃ −11◦, ∆θA(H,D, V,A) =
{3.2◦, 0.9◦,−0.7◦,−2.3◦}, α = 12.3◦, δ = 3.6◦,
∆θB(H/V,D/A) = {−1.8◦, 0◦}. As expected, the phase
errors are relatively small and those associated with θA
and θB are within the resolution of the rotating mounts
housing the wave plates. The non-zero α also agrees with
the measured classical visibility of 94% for the p-cnot
gate. We plot the fitted IR based on this model in Fig. 5
for the H–V basis (open diamonds, dashed line) and the
D–A basis (open triangles, dashed line).
In summary, we have demonstrated experimentally the
first complete physical simulation of the entangling-probe
attack, showing that Eve can gain Re´nyi information of
up to 0.9 under realistic operating conditions, including a
cnot gate that does not have an ultrahigh fidelity. Our
results suggest the possible amount of information gain
by Eve with current technology and the need to evaluate
the required level of privacy amplification.
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